

LIVERPOOL CLASSICAL MONTHLY

Vol. 13 No 4 April 1988

Edited, printed and published at Liverpool
by Dr J.Pinsent & Ms Helena Hurt, BA
Dept of Classics and Archaeology
The University,
P.O. Box 147 Liverpool, L69 3BX,
RATES for 1988, 10 issues (not August and September)
SURFACE £8.50 UK, £9.50 Europe, \$(US)17.50 elsewhere
AIR £10 Europe, \$(US)27.50 N.America, \$(US)35 Australasia.

CONTENTS, of which the authors retain the copyright
The Editor retains copyright in the format



Correspondence from John Ferguson, M.A., B.D., F.I.A.L.	50
Christopher Gill (Aberystwyth): <i>Eric Havelock : an obituary</i>	50-51
Duane W.Roller (Ohio State, Lima): <i>The sources of Lucretius</i>	51-55
H.Dettmer (Iowa): <i>A poetic signature in Propertius 1.22.2?</i>	55-56
J.Roy (Sheffield): <i>Demosthenes 55 as evidence for isolated farmsteads in classical Attica</i>	57-59
Shorter notes	
Pamela M.Huby (Liverpool): <i>Boetius vindicates Cicero as a logician</i>	60-61
F.M.A.Jones (Chatham): <i>The lacuna at Petronius 26.6</i>	61
James Diggle (Queens' College, Cambridge): <i>Housman, Scaliger, and Wordsworth</i>	61
Brian Arkins (Galway) & Desmond Egan (Newbridge): <i>Another translation of Catullus 85</i>	62-63
Jeremy Paterson (Newcastle upon Tyne): <i>Roman tankers</i>	62
P.Murgatroyd (Natal: Pietermaritzberg): <i>Some aspects of the structure of Pindar, Pythian 1,</i>	62-63
D.N.Levin (Rice University, Houston): <i>Two notes on Heliodorus</i>	64

'This number of *LCM*', like the previous one, has been set, printed, and despatched solely by the Editor, which may account both for the typographical errors (he regrets the Joycean 'Irishoral poet' of last month's contents) and the late appearance. It is clear to him that *LCM* is currently running a month late, and imagines that this may well continue until the Summer Vacation. He can console himself with the knowledge that outstanding orders for back files have at least been printed and will soon be despatched: and must announce that in future such orders can only be fulfilled during that Vacation, though they may, of course, be placed at any time.

Meanwhile the EA has not been idle, but has been mastering (mistressing? 'Learning to manipulate' is her preferred phrase) the new Ware, both hard and soft, which *LCM* has acquired and which not only has and will fully equip it for Desk Top Publishing by the capability of actually incorporating pictures and photographs in the text but will also enable typescript and computer printout to be fed directly into the MacPlus, thus liberating the Editor from the chore of typing up each number and leaving him free to concentrate on other activities such as writing. Contributors are therefore asked to include in their MSS details of the type in which they have been produced (e.g. Courier, Prestige, etc.) or of the computer font employed. They may also send discs, not only Mac discs but also IBM ones and IBM clones, since one of the pieces of equipment is a disc reader and translator. Readers will appreciate that *LCM* has made a rapid quantum leap into the new technology, as indeed Classics Departments generally must do if they are to survive and to prove to an unsympathetic government that they too equip their graduates with 'marketable skills' and do not, as the Prime Minister is reported to believe, 'corrupt the young' in a Socratic manner – though the Editor at least hopes that they will continue to do that as well, the production of critical minds, to which nothing is sacred, being not the least of the duties of Universities.

But the Editor is preaching again. He had meant to speak of students. For his visit to Dublin, where the International Association of Classical Students not only put on a conference that can bear comparison with that of the Classical Association, in the course of which they entertained him

and the other speakers, but also did him the great honour of electing him Honorary President for as long as he cares to serve. Particularly to be remarked was the lively discussion which each lecture produced, and the Editor was led to reflect upon the degree to which we have professionalized ourselves and sometimes seem either unable or unwilling to stimulate the interest of our students in the subject (rather than in passing examinations) and to associate them with us, except in rhetorical statements at matriculation or graduation, as junior partners in a common pursuit. Practically he thinks it perhaps time that the Classical Association and the Joint Association of Classical Teachers (JACT) got themselves together and associated students and student societies (such as that of Trinity College Dublin which hosted the occasion that provoked these thoughts) with them. If we treat our students as 'kiddies' they will sense our veiled contempt and behave as we seem to expect them to do. And that is not good for them, for us, for our Universities and for our subject.

More preaching, but the Editor has quoted Collingwood before, 'cackling is my business and cackle I will', even if, as a reader has remarked, it means that what another reader calls 'the preamble' gets longer each month. Yet another correspondent tells him that there is a sense in which the University of Tel Aviv (which does subscribe) could count as Dan, at least according to the Israel Tour Guide. In *Joshua* 19.46 Jaffa is a city allotted to Dan, though the tribe later moved north to the Galilee, but the name was left and 'greater Tel Aviv is called the Dan area until today'. If so, it seems that the University of Dan already exists and that *LCM* is already known to it as

well as to that of Beersheba. 

Correspondence from John Ferguson, M.A., B.D., F.I.A.L.,
18.4.88

102 Oakfield Road,
Selly Park, Birmingham, B29 7ED

Sir, I fundamentally disagree with the critic of your *-tt-* in *formatted*. I should charge you with illiteracy for turning a noun into a verb: it is not given as a verb in Chambers. But the "rules" for doubling the final consonant are *not clear*.

(a) A monosyllable, and probably a polysyllable, ending in a double vowel followed by a single consonant, does *not* double; e.g. *sealed*.

(b) A monosyllable ending in a single vowel followed by a single consonant doubles; e.g. *bragged*.

(c) The basic rule for polysyllables is that they double *if* accented on the final syllable; e.g. *refér(red)*.

(d) But if the longer form throws the accent back they do *not* double; e.g. *réference*.

(e) This however is not totally consistent; e.g. *cómbat* allows *combated* (regular in U.S.) or *combatted*, and I submit that the same would apply to *format* if it existed as a verb.

(f) A very long word does not double; e.g. *unparalleled*.

(g) I think that there is an ambiguity about 3-syllable words. The older books (and indeed Chambers) all give *benefited*. But I submit (i) the base is *bénéfit*, with at least a secondary accent on the ultimate, which would give *benefitted*: (ii) the analogy from *fit* cannot be ignored (cf. *wórship* > *worshipped*): (iii) I suspect that usage now favours *benefitted* and *benefited* about equally (though U.S. go for *benefited*), and grammar, spelling etc. follow usage: (iv) I don't think I can escape from the natural pronunciation of *benefited* as *benefighted*.

So I think it is wrong to complain of the *spelling* 'formatted', and I don't think that *benefited* is as clear as the handbooks make out.

Yours etc., John Ferguson.

The Editor takes some comfort from this letter, and pleads that the formation of a verb from a noun is as common in English as the reverse, and that usage requires a new word for a new process. But he would be glad to hear from others about a matter apposite when a new report on the teaching of English has just appeared, and appropriate in a journal devoted to those languages for and in which grammar was first devised.

Christopher Gill (Aberystwyth): *Eric Havelock : an obituary*

LCM 13.4 (Apr.1988), 50-51

Eric Havelock died on April 4, 1988, aged 84. Born (1904) and educated in Britain (The Leys School and Emmanuel College, Cambridge), he had a distinguished career in North America, in

the course of which he was Chairman of the Classics Department at both Harvard and Yale; at Yale he presided over a substantial expansion of the Department in the 1960s. His range of scholarly interests was wide, and he published books on Catullus (1939) and on Aeschylus' *Prometheus* (1951), before producing *The Liberal Temper in Greek Politics* (1957), a major study of Greek political and educational theory, including a radical reappraisal of the role of the sophists. In the last thirty years his work was centred on the exploration of the cultural implications of the transition from orality to literacy, as exemplified in Greece. The books of this period, especially *Preface to Plato* (1963), *The Greek Concept of Justice* (1978), and *The Literate Revolution in Greece and its Cultural Consequence* (1982), have made a fundamental contribution to the developing field of communication studies, and earned him an international reputation which went well beyond the Classical milieu. *Language and Thought in Early Greek Philosophy* (ed. Kevin Robb for the *Monist Library of Philosophy*, Las Salle, Illinois, 1983), a collection of essays based on or derived from his work, gives some indication of his influence. His books convey the intellectual energy, breadth of vision, and love of controversy which were his salient characteristics. His loss will be felt by all those who knew him as an inspiring teacher, and a loyal and supportive colleague and friend. He is survived by his widow, Christine Havelock, a Professor at Vassar, who is an eminent scholar of Hellenistic art.
Copyright © 1988 Christopher Gill.

Duane W. Roller (Ohio State, Lima): *The sources of Lucretius*

LCM 13.4 (Apr.1988), 51-55

An earlier version of this paper was read at the Midwest Junto of the History of Science, Minneapolis, April 1985

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- ALFONSI, Luigi, 'Tra Euripide e Lucrezio', *Hermes* 96 (1968), 118-121.
 BAILEY, Cyril, *Titi Lucreti Cari de Rerum Natura Libri Sex* (Oxford 1947).
 BOLLACK, Jean, 'Lucrez und Empedokles', *Die neue Rundschau* 70 (1959), 656-86.
 BOLLACK, Mayotte, 'La chaîne aimantine: Lucrèce et ses modèles grecs', *REL* 41 (1963), 165-85.
 BRINK, C.O., 'Ennius and the Hellenistic Worship of Homer', *AJP* 93 (1972), 547-67.
 BUCHHEIT, Vinzenz, 'Epiukurs Triumph des Geistes', *Hermes* 99 (1971), 303-23.
 CLASSEN, C. Joachim, 'Poetry and Rhetoric in Lucretius', *TAPhA* 99 (1968), 77-118.
 CLAY, Diskin, *Lucretius and Epicurus* (Ithaca N.Y. 1983).
 COSTA, C.D.N., *Lucretius, de rerum natura V* (Oxford 1984).
 DE LACY, P.H., 'Lucretius and the History of Epicureanism', *TAPhA* 79 (1948), 12-23.
 EDELSTEIN, Ludwig, 'Primum Graius Homo (Lucretius I.66)', *TAPhA* 71 (1940), 78-90.
 GIGON, Olof, 'Lukrez und Ennius', in *Lucrèce (Fondation Hardt, entretiens 24)* [Geneva 1977], 168-191.
 KENNEY, E.J. (1), 'Doctus Lucretius', *Mnemosyne* 23 (1970), 366-92.
 (2), *Lucretius (Greece and Rome, New Surveys in the Classics 11)* [Oxford 1977].
 LEONARD, William Ellery, & Stanley Barney SMITH, *T. Lucreti Cari De Rerum Natura Libri Sex* (Madison, Wisconsin, 1942).
 MAGUINNESS, W.S., 'The language of Lucretius', in *Lucretius* (ed. D.R. Dudley, New York 1965) 69-94.
 MURLEY, Clyde, 'Lucretius and the History of Satire', *TAPhA* 70 (1939), 380-95.
 RÖSLER, Wolfgang, 'Lukrez und der Vorsokratiker', *Hermes* 101 (1973), 48-64.
 SALLMAN, Klaus, 'Studien zum philosophischen Naturbegriff der Römer mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des Lukrez', *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* 7 (1962), 140-284.
 SCHRIJVERS, P.H., *Horror ac divina voluptas* (Amsterdam 1970).
 TATUM, W. Jeffery, 'The Presocratics in Book One of Lucretius' *de rerum natura*, *TAPhA* 114 (1984), 177-89.
 VAN DER MEER, H.F., *Euhemerus van Messene* (n.p. 1949).
 WALLACH, Barbara Price, *Lucretius and the Diatribe Against the Fear of Death*, *Mnemosyne* supp.40 (Leiden 1976).
 WARMINGTON, E.H., *Remains of Old Latin*, vol.1 (Loeb, Cambridge, Mass. 1935, revised 1956 & 1961).
 WEST, David, *The Imagery and Poetry of Lucretius* (Edinburgh 1969).
 WRIGHT, M.R., *Empedocles: the Extant Fragments* (New Haven 1981).

It has long been known that *de rerum natura* is an exposition in Latin hexameters of certain Greek philosophical ideas; indeed the very title seems a direct translation of *περὶ φύσεως*, the monumental work of Epikouros of Athens. By late antiquity Lucretius and Epikouros had been associated (Clay 16-17), and, beginning in the 16th century, Lucretius was seen merely as the summarizer of Epikouros (Clay 16-19). Given the shadowy nature of Epikouros' own career and writings (Clay 54-81, 267-276), Lucretius' work remains a major source for Epicurean thought. Yet the name of Epikouros occurs only once in the poem.

Epikouros is one of eight predecessors Lucretius mentioned as sources. The first to be cited are Ennius (1.117) and Homer (1.124). This is fitting: the founder of Latin literature and the founder of Greek literature, mentioned in tandem; Ennius himself acknowledged his own debt to Homer (*Annales* 2-13 Warmington, cf. 2-12 Skutsch; see also West 30-34; Brink 547-567). Shortly thereafter are references to Herakleitos (1.638), Empedokles (1.716), and Anaxagoras (1.830, 876; Rösler 54-57). Later is a mention of Demokritos (3.371); later still, citation of unnamed Chaldaeans (5.727, probably Berosus, Bailey 1339-40; Leonard & Smith 706). In addition, there are sources which are not specified by name, most notably Thucydides (6.1090-1286). Many others have been suggested; these include the Pythagoreans (Leonard & Smith 271), Parmenides (Leonard & Smith 201, 271; Kenney (1), 370, 378), Euripides (Alfonsi 118-121), Hippokrates (Bailey 1719), Oinopides of Chios (Leonard & Smith 271), Aristophanes (Murley 380), Theophrastos (Clay 24), Menander (Leonard & Smith 16-17), and Cicero (Bailey 30).

But what of Epikouros? Although it has been argued that 'he does not need to be named to be recognized' (Clay 26), few without detailed knowledge of Greek philosophy would ever know that Epikouros has any important role in the poem. The single citation of the philosopher is in a Herodotean discussion of the inevitability of death (3.1042; see Wallach, *passim*, and Schrijvers 231-235). Leonard and Smith's assertion (151) that 'the reticence is a mark of pride and reverence', lacks credibility, as does Bailey's belief (1169; see also 61) that 'the name of a *deus* was too sacred to be uttered, but here in a list of historical persons it is unavoidable'. Lucretius' very point is that death comes to *everyone*, and thus specific mention of Epikouros would indeed have been avoidable. Moreover, in these lines Epikouros is linked not with philosophers but with famous kings and leaders of the past, also mentioned nowhere else in the poem; Ancus Marcius (3.1025, quoting Ennius, *Annales* 154W. = 137S.), Scipio Africanus (3.1034), and Xerxes, who, interestingly, is not mentioned by name, but identified only by a descriptive phrase (3.1029-1033).

Perhaps, though, one is expected to realize that Epikouros was Lucretius' inspiration and subject from the very phrase *de rerum natura*, essentially the title of the work itself (Sallmann 235-249), and similar to the title of a work by the Greek philosopher. Whether or not Lucretius' immediate successors called the work by this title (Clay 82-3) is not of importance; it is a crucial phrase, and Vergil's clear reference (*Georgics* 2.490 *felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas*) indicates that *rerum* was a key word in identifying Lucretius. The phrase first occurs early in the poem:

quae quoniam rerum naturam sola gubernas 1.21.

Yet this is not addressed to any mortal, but to the goddess Venus herself. Four lines later is the phrase again:

quos ego de rerum natura pangere conor 1.25.

No one would think of Epikouros and his *περὶ φύσεως* here; Lucretius' contemporaries would more likely catch the archaism *pangere conor* and recognize it as a phrase in the Latin epic tradition (see Ennius, *Annales* 291W. = 293 S.; Leonard & Smith 131; Maguinness 83-4). Lucretius placed himself within the epic tradition at the very opening of the poem, derived from Ennius, *Annales* 49-50W. = 58-9S. (Gigon 168-191):

*Aeneadum genetrix, hominum divumque voluptas,
alma Venus, caeli subter labentia signa
quae mare navigerum, quae terras frugiferentis
concelebras, per te quoniam genus omne animantum
concipitur visitque exortum lumina solis:
te, dea, te fugiunt venti, te nubila caeli
adventumque tuum, tibi suavis daedala tellus
summitet flores, tibi ridet aequora ponti
placatumque nitet diffuso lumine caelum.*

...

quae quoniam rerum naturam sola gubernas. 1.1-9, 21.

It is only later that the poem turns from mythological to human concerns:

*humana ante oculos foede cum vita iaceret
in terris oppressa gravi sub religione
quae caput a caeli regionibus ostendabat
horribili super aspectu mortalibus instans,
primum Graius homo mortalis tollere contra
est oculos ausus primusque obsistere contra.* 1.62-7 (see Bailey 608-11;
West 57-63; Buchheit 303-23)

The phrase *Graius homo* (derived from Ennius, *Annales* 178W. = 165S.) is generally taken to refer coyly to Epikouros. Bailey (610-11) was 'almost certain that the reference here must be to Epicurus'. To Schrijvers (255) it was indicative of 'la grandeur des exploits d'Epicure'. Yet few in Lucretius' audience would have caught such an allusion. In fact, such an interpretation is full of problems, largely because of historical inaccuracy (Edelstein 78-90; Leonard & Smith, 206, noted that it would apply better to Leukippos and Demokritos). But the statement needs no specifying and is merely a reverent acknowledgement of Greek primacy in intellectual endeavors (Clay 97). It could apply to any Greek intellectual figure.

Soon Lucretius again mentioned the scope of his work:

*Ennius aeternis exponit versibus edens,
...
unde sibi exortam semper florentis Homeri
commemoratur speciem lacrimas effundere salsas
coepisse et rerum naturam expandere dictis.* 1.121, 124-6

Here is the first mortal credited with understanding the nature of things: Homer, via Ennius. The *Graius homo* would thus seem to be Ennius' inspiration, Homer. Lucretius has appealed to a higher authority than the writings of a mere philosopher: he has called upon Ennius, Homer, and Venus. Only after this authority has been established does the poem consider philosophy.

Even those among Lucretius' readers who were aware of Epikouros' *περὶ φύσεως*, few though they must have been, and who saw Lucretius' title as a reflexion of that work, could not be certain. There was another *περὶ φύσεως* written by a better-known Greek than Epikouros, one more in the philosophical mainstream: Empedokles of Akragas (Bailey 725; Clay 89-93; Bollack, J. 656-86; Wright, *passim*); in fact, Lucretius may have been a devotee of this philosopher before becoming an Epicurean (Leonard & Smith 32, 51, 66). Empedokles himself had written philosophical poetry, thereby providing Lucretius with the precedent he needed to write his own philosophical poem; poetry had not been viewed with favor by Epikouros (Classen 110-11). Imitation of Empedokles appears as early as 1.31-4 (Kenney 2, 15), and soon Lucretius explicitly acknowledged his debt:

*hic [Empedokles] tamen et supra quos diximus inferiores
partibus egregie multis molto minores,
quamquam multa bene ac divinitus invenientes
ex adyto tamquam cordis responsa dedere
sanctius et multa certa ratione magis quam
Pythia quae tripodi a Phoebi lauroque profatur.* 1.734-9; Edelstein 83-4;
West 33-4; Clay 49-52).

Lucretius reserved rare terminology for describing Empedokles: this is one of only two uses of the word *sanctius* (the other is the repeat at 5.111, noted below). Thus Lucretius recognized Empedokles as one who spoke with greater authority than the most revered of Greek institutions, the oracle of Apollo at Delphi. This was an honor Lucretius never gave Epikouros. Later he repeated the phrase

*qua prius aggrediar quam de re fundere fata
sanctius et multa certa ratione magis quam
Pythia quae tripodi a Phoebi lauroque profatur,
multa tibi expediam doctis solacia dictis* 5.110-114.

This exact repetition of the earlier phrase now proclaims Lucretius as a new Empedokles, who can himself now replace the Delphic oracle. To emphasize the parallel between himself and Empedokles Lucretius wrote:

*ut fit ubi insolitam rem apportes auribus ante
nec tamen hanc possis oculorum subdere visu
nec iacere indu manus, via qua munita fidei*

proxima fert humanum in pectus templaque mentis. 5.100-103 (Costa 59)

This is a direct paraphrase of a fragment of Empedokles:

οὐκ ἔστιν πελάσασθαι ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ἐφικτόν
ἡμετέροις ἢ χερσὶ λαβεῖν, ἥπερ τε μέγιστη
πειθοῦς ἀνθρώποισιν ἀμαξίτος εἰς φρένα πίπτει. Diels B133; Wright fr.96;
Clay fr.3, pp.50-51.

Lucretius' version also repeats the metaphor, of a human perceptive organ as a temple, which he had used in his earlier praise of Empedokles (1.734-9; see also Bollack, M., 182).

In the same part of the poem, Lucretius discussed the origin of *sapientia*:

*dicendum est, deus ille fuit, deus, inclute Memmi,
qui princeps vitae rationem invenit eam quae
nunc appellatur sapientia, quique per artem
fluctibus e tantis vitam tantisque tenebris
in tam tranquillo et tam clara luce locavit*
...
*quo magis hic merito nobis deus esse videtur,
ex quo nunc etiam per magnas didita gentis
dulcia permulcent animos solacia vitae* 5.8-12, 19-21

These lines are conventionally taken as praise (Edelstein 87; Bailey 1323; Leonard & Smith 647). But they are in fact a close paraphrase of Empedokles (Diels B112; Wright fr.102: *ἐγὼ δ' ἡμῖν θεὸς ἄμβροτος*). Moreover, the metaphor of learned words calming the mind is similar to Lucretius' assertion of himself as the new Empedokles (5.110-14), and thus the praise of the man who *deus esse videtur* seems to refer to none other than Empedokles. But neither Empedokles nor Epikouros can be said to have discovered that method of life which is now called *sapientia*, and actually the thought comes from an entirely different source, the ideas on ruler cult and deification advanced by Epikouros' contemporary Euemeros of Messene (Wallach 89; Leonard & Smith 645). Yet many of Lucretius' actual words and phrases come from Ennius. Perhaps, then, it is not surprising that Ennius wrote a book titled *Euhemerus* (fragments collected by Warmington; on Euemeros generally, see Van der Meer; Gigon 184-5).

Lucretius reveled in ambiguity. Using the ambiguities possible in an inflected language, he delighted in taking his reader down a path and then triumphantly demonstrating that it is the wrong path, only to do the same again when the new path also turns out to be wrong. The passages just quoted are typical. The first source that would have occurred to Lucretius' contemporaries is Ennius: perhaps those who knew Ennius well would see the hint of Euemeros. But then Lucretius demonstrated that he has in fact been quoted Empedokles – or is it the new Epikouros? Which *περὶ φύσεως* was Lucretius' model?

Lucretius was well aware that the title *de rerum natura* could be used ambiguously to suggest simultaneously two earlier works, and perhaps others, such as Aristotle's *φυσικὰ*. But Lucretius' refusal to mention Epikouros by name, except in the most trivial of circumstances, demonstrates that his topic was Greek knowledge as a whole, not the writings of a single philosopher. His comments in sequence on the theories of Herakleitos, Empedokles, and Anaxagoras are drawn from a Hellenistic summary of early Greek philosophy, rather than the works of the philosophers themselves:

magno opere a vero longe derrasse videntur.

...
*et qui quattuor ex rebus posse omnia rentur
ex igni terra atque anima procreare et imbri.*
quorum Acragantinus cum primis Empedocles est. 1.711, 714-6

Surely this is a surprising comment to make about one elsewhere called a god. Here Empedokles is hardly a role model for Lucretius. Thus it is probable that this information came from a source other than Empedokles' own writings, perhaps from an Epicurean tract which presented negatively the works of earlier philosophers (Clay 22). Lucretius' comments on *Babylonica Chaldaeorum doctrina* (5.727) may come from a similar source. These arguments may have been presented to make the case for Epicurean poetry (Tatum 189); in fact, Lucretius' positive attitude towards poetry indicates that he was influenced by Epicureanism as much as, or more than, by Epikouros himself (De Lacy 12-23).

There are several different sources for Lucretius' material, then, and, moreover, a

Epicurean tracts were certainly used (De Lacy 12-23), the latter as sources for the early philosophers, but Lucretius also used some of the writings of these philosophers directly, even when they contradicted the Epicurean view. Other prose authors, from Herodotos to Theophrastos, were also used extensively. But all of this was placed within the totally different framework of Greek mythology and pastoral lyric, which are constant elements in the poem and demonstrate a debt to the Greek poetic tradition from Homer to Bion. Empedokles provided access to this poetical tradition through the medium of a philosophical poem (Maguinness 82).

Yet superior to all these influences is the one to which Lucretius gave primacy: Ennius, the founder of Latin literature (on Lucretius and the epic tradition, see West 23-4). Here there is no ambiguity: Lucretius has made it dramatically clear that his ultimate debt is to his own people, who created a Latin language that finally, under Lucretius' skillful guidance, was suitable for rendering the entire scope of Greek literature. Hence Lucretius' joyous assertion that he is a pioneer:

peragro loca nullius ante

trita solo.

1.926-7: see Clay 41

and his emphasis on the difficulty of his task:

*nec me animi fallit Graiorum obscura reperta
difficile inlustrare Latinis versibus esse,
multa novis verbis praesertim cum sit agendum
propter egestatem linguae et rerum novitatem*

1.136-9; see Bailey 623

These lines sum up the genius of Lucretius' creation. If he were merely the translator or paraphraser of Epikouros, his claim becomes hopelessly pompous. Yet Lucretius created philosophy that was literature, a return to poetry, the medium of Greek philosophers long before Epikouros. Ever since the early pre-Socratics, philosophical thought had rejected the traditional religious, Homeric way of looking at the world. Homer and philosophy were incompatible; soon poetry and philosophy were to be seen as equally incompatible. Yet Lucretius joined everything together again: the concept of *de rerum natura* (whether taken from Epikouros or Empedokles or Aristotle) was attributed to Homer, the ultimate discoverer of the nature of things. Thus he demonstrated (as Epikouros in his turgid prose had failed to do) that philosophy must first be literature before it can teach. In his joining of opposites he anticipated one of his most deliberate imitators, John Milton, who wrote on 'Things unattempted yet in Prose or Rhyme' (*Paradise Lost* 1.16; see also 7.453-74 & 10.1075-8; on Lucretius and Milton, see Leonard & Smith 64-6). Both used paganism to provide a framework for the new religion

Copyright © 1988 Duane W. Roller

H.Dettmer (Iowa): A poetic signature in Propertius 1.22.2?

LCM 13.4 (Apr.1988), 55-56

*qualis et unde genus, qui sint mihi, Tulli, Penates,
quaeris pro nostra semper amicitia.
si Perusina tibi patriae sunt nota sepulchra,
Italiae duris funera temporibus,
cum Romana suos egit discordia civis,
(sic mihi praecipue, pulvis Etrusca, dolor,
tu proiecta mei perpessa es membra propinqui,
tu nullo miseri contegis ossa solo)
proxima supposito contingens Umbria campo
me genuit terris fertilis uberibus.*

5

10

'What sort of person am I, where is my homeland, who is my family, you ask, Tullus, in the name of our long friendship'. So begins the final poem of the *Monobiblos*. The poem's point of departure is curious, because ostensibly Propertius, ignoring the first and third questions, later answers only the second: *Umbria me genuit* (9-10). The solutions proffered for the poet's reticence are not satisfactory. To take two examples: W.A.Camps, *Propertius: Elegies Book I*, Cambridge 1966, ad loc., suggests that the three questions are essentially the same; W.R.Nethercut, *AJP* 92 (1971), 465 n.4, that 'Propertius does not need to tell Tullus his name, for Tullus already knows it'. The present paper will propose that Propertius *does* answer the first and third questions also, albeit allusively.

To the best of my knowledge, no one has noticed that Propertius signed verse 2 syllabically (for syllable wordplay in Latin poetry in general, see F.Ahl, *Metaformations*, Ithaca and London

(for syllable wordplay in Latin poetry in general, see F.Ahl, *Metaformations*, Ithaca and London 1985, esp 17-63: *quaeris PRO nostra semPER amiciTIA*).

Since Sextus Propertius is the poet's entire name (Donatus, *Verg. Vit.* 12.45, the feminine 'Pro-per-tia' presumably modifies an understood *gens* (cf. *Iulia gens*, Livy 1.3.2; *Cornelia gens*, Livy 38.58.3; *ex gente Domitia*, Suet., *Nerv.*1). If so, through this learned display Propertius replies to the third of Tullus' questions (*qui sint mihi, Tulle, Penates*). The Propertian family is the one to which he belongs. At the same time the signed verse 2 also answers the first of Tullus' questions; *qualis (sim)* is a kind of conflation of 'who and what sort of person am I?' (on this point cf. the comments of M.C.J.Putnam, *QUCC* 23 [1976], 94-5, and of Nethercut 465 n.4), and the answer is 'My name is Propertius; by signing so cleverly I am suggesting my neoteric-Alexandrian pedigree'.

Statistics support the deliberateness of the syllabic wordplay here (and later in verse 7, to be discussed below). The number of instances in which 'pro-' and 'per-' appear in separate words in the same line is remarkably small. Except for 1.22.1 and 7, there are no other occurrences in Book 1. There are two occurrences in Book 2 (*PRO di, PERfida*, 2.9.28; *PERsolvit . . . PROcellis*, 2.25.23), two in Book 3 (*opPRObrii . . . PER ora*, 3.3.12; *semPER . . . PROmeruere*, 3.23.10), and one in Book 4 (*luPERcus . . . PROtegit*, 4.1.93). None of the occurrences in Books 2-4, however, is completed by the element '-tia' or '-ssa' (E.B.Holtzmark, *Pattern Search*, Computer Program for Word-Searching in Classical Texts, 1982).

The syllabic signature of verse 2 has further significance. C.1.22 is a *sphragis*. It is customary for a seal poem to contain the name of the author, for its purpose is to safeguard the work against theft (E.Fraenkel, *Horace*, Oxford, Clarendon, 1957, 362-3, L.Woodbury, *Studies in honour of Gilbert Norwood*, Toronto 1952, and E.N.Collinge, *The Structure of Horace's Odes*, London 1961, 44 n.2, in fact insist that in order for a poem to be a *sphragis* the author's name *must* appear). Thus the learned *Pro-per-tia* is attractive also because the reader expects to find the poet's name in this final poem. As G.O.Hutchinson, *JRS* 74 (1984), 104 n.30, remarks, Propertius' suppressing his name is 'startling in a *sphragis* which opens as this one does'. The observation is worth making, too, that although Propertius' name appears eight times in the other three books, it does not appear previously in the *Monobiblos*. Its absence from Book 1 raises the tantalizing possibility then that the poet intentionally reserved his signature for the last poem. This possibility is strengthened by the poem's content and the high percentage of polysyllabic pentameter endings, which suggest an early date of composition.

Somewhat analogous to Propertius 1.22.2 is a Vergilian signature at *Georgics* 1.429-33. Vergil signs this passage in an acrostic: *MAximus VEntus PUra* (429, 431, 433) that reverses *PUBlius VERgilius MARo* (E.L.Brown, *Numeri Vergiliani*, Coll. Latomus 63 [1963], 102). Like the signature of Propertius, that of Vergil appears in a place of significance, in a passage in which Vergil indicates his debt to the *Phaenomena* by imitating an acrostic of Aratus (for a discussion, see D.O.Ross, Jr., *Backgrounds to Augustan Poetry*, Cambridge 1975, 28-9).

Propertius' indicating his *doctrina* by signing syllabically well accords with the intent of the final poem. Surely its purpose is to justify to his rich and politically ambitious friend his own choice of the *vita iners* by recalling an incident from the Perusine War that made such an impression on him in his youth (for possible political overtones in 1.22, see H.-P.Stahl, *Propertius: "Love" and "War"*, Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London 1985, 99-129). I would further like to propose that Propertius in 1.22 indicates his abhorrence of war and hence of politics through another syllabic wordplay. *PROiecta . . . PERpeSSA* (*pro-per-ssa* = *Propertia*) in verse 7 poignantly underscores that the otherwise nameless relative, who lies still unburied, was a member of the Propertian clan*. The Etruscan dust thus ironically withholds the minimum required for burial (three handfuls of dust) from the poet's kinsman, whose decomposing flesh and bones make fertile the Italian soil. On this powerfully haunting note the *Monobiblos* ends.

*I follow L.Richardson, Jr., *Propertius: Elegies I-IV*, Norman 1976, intro, ad. 1.21, in not construing *Gallus* of C.1.21 as Propertius' kin of C.1.22. The common features of the closing poems of Book 1 may have been meant to indicate simply that as casualties of war the two men suffered similar fates.

Copyright © 1988 Helena Dettmer.

J.Roy (Sheffield): *Demosthenes 55 as evidence for isolated farmsteads in classical Attica*¹

LCM 13.4 (Apr.1988), 57-59

I am very grateful to Dr R.I.Winton for his comments on an earlier draft of this paper; he is in no way responsible for its remaining deficiencies.

At a time when classical archaeologists and historians are showing increasing interest in the ancient countryside, Dr R. Osborne has recently performed the valuable service of reviewing the pattern of settlement in classical Attica. So far as literary evidence is concerned he offers an unequivocal judgement: 'There is no clear evidence in the literature for anyone who lives and farms out on his own in the countryside'². One of the texts considered by Osborne as possible evidence of isolated farmsteads, but then rejected, is Demosthenes 55³. It is the purpose of this note to argue that the speech does, on the contrary, attest two isolated farmsteads in fourth-century Attica, and indeed suggests there were more.

The general situation of the two properties about which the lawsuit arose seems clear. The defendant (the speaker) and the plaintiff owned, as their fathers had before them, neighbouring pieces of land somewhere – we do not know where – in the Attic countryside. Between the two properties ran a road, and water from the surrounding hills ran off partly down the road and partly over adjoining farms; if the water running down the road met an obstacle, it ran on to adjoining land. Under an earlier owner the defendant's property had been neglected; as a result water had begun to make its way across the land, and also people had begun to walk on the land and pasture on it. The defendant's father, after acquiring the land, therefore walled it off (55.10-11). Years later the plaintiff sued on the grounds that water was being diverted on to his land because of the wall (55.20-21). We have of course only the defendant's statement of the case, but there is no reason to doubt the circumstances just described, save that the plaintiff claimed that a public watercourse had been walled in (55.12-13)⁴.

Osborne recognizes that the speech might be taken as a dispute between two men living in farmsteads on neighbouring properties, but he rejects that view, using a variety of arguments.

One argument is that the Greek word for neighbour (*geiton*) carries no implication of residence; the owners of adjacent properties could be described as 'neighbours' even if they lived far from the properties and far from each other. This is absolutely correct, and no conclusion can be drawn from the use of the term (as in 55.4) without further evidence. The possibility of 'neighbours' living in adjacent properties is not, of course, excluded.

Osborne also notes that the defendant makes a distinction between water running off a piece of land (*khōrion*) and water running off a house (*oikia*) (55.26)⁵, and that Plato makes much the same distinction in very similar terms (*Laws* 844c); and Osborne goes on to suppose that the distinction is between, on the one hand, a house in a village (or town) and, on the other, farm-land with no dwelling-house. In response to Osborne one must recognize that when the defendant, and Plato, discuss questions of drainage they certainly distinguish between drainage from a house or

1. By 'isolated farmhouse' is meant here a piece of farmland on which stood a farmhouse serving as residence for the farmer; in such a case the dwellinghouse would not form part of a nucleated settlement such as a village, although there might be other similar farmsteads at a moderate distance.

2. R. Osborne, *Demos: the discovery of classical Attica* (Cambridge 1985). The statement quoted is on p.17.

3. The speech is discussed by Osborne at pp.17-18 and n.10 on p.220. Whether the speech is actually by Demosthenes has been questioned (Gernet in his introduction to the Budé text, *Démosthène, plaidoyers civils*, Tome III [Paris 1959]), but that issue is irrelevant to the present discussion, provided that the text is accepted – as it usually is – as an authentic Athenian lawcourt speech of the fourth century B.C..

4. Several aspects of the legal situation in this case are obscure, but that is another matter: see the discussion, with references to earlier work, in A.R.W. Harrison, *The law at Athens*, Vol.I: *The family and property* (Oxford 1968), pp.249-252.

v. also Harrison, *ibid.* p.174, on the lawsuit concerning the same piece of land brought by the plaintiff of this case against a slave of the defendant (55.31-34). Clearly the slave was closely associated with the land, but that is hardly enough to show that he lived on it.

5. The same distinction occurs also at 55.19, and at 55.17 with reference to water flowing on to a house or land.

building and drainage from a piece of land. It seems a fair assumption that the buildings were envisaged as having little or no land around them (indicated e.g. by *homotoichon*, 'having a party-wall', in Plato); but there is no reason to believe conversely that the land could not have had a house or building somewhere on it (though obviously it need not). The key issue in this context is drainage over the legal boundaries of one property on to another property, and the presence or absence of a building away from the boundaries of a piece of land is irrelevant.

Osborne also derives arguments from what the speaker does, or does not, mention in describing the two properties. Firstly, the plaintiff complained of damage to an old wall and to some grain: 'reference to damage to a dwelling would make a better case and must surely have been made if there was a dwelling or if the grain had been in a dwelling'. Secondly, Osborne notes that the wall on the defendant's land was built to prevent trespassers grazing on the land, 'which would hardly be a problem if there were a residence on the land'. Thirdly, in order to prove that the land is not a natural or public water-course, the speaker resorts to references to family tombs and vineyards on the land (55.13); that, says Osborne, is 'a rather weak argument which he could hardly have failed to strengthen by referring to a dwelling on the land if there had been one'.

As to the way in which the damage alleged by the plaintiff is described in the speech, it must be admitted that certain aspects are 'puzzling' (Osborne's term). The defendant is clearly anxious to minimize the damage, spends little time on it, and leaves much unclear: less than three medimni of barley got wet, he says, as did about half a medimnus of flour, and an oil-jar was knocked over without suffering damage, while, if the plaintiff had repaired an old wall which had neither fallen down nor suffered any serious damage, he, the defendant, should not be made to pay (55.24-25). Presumably the barley, flour and oil were stored in a building, but the speech does not indicate what sort of a building that was, nor whether the 'old wall' formed part of the building. There is admittedly no mention of a dwelling-house; but the defendant may have been anxious not to admit that the plaintiff's dwelling-house had been flooded, or alternatively the grain, flour, and oil may have been in a storehouse or shed, in which case there could still have been a dwelling house elsewhere on the plaintiff's land.

The argument that people would not have trespassed on the land if there had been a residence is not strong. It supposes that the property was small enough to be surveyed and protected from a residence somewhere on it, or small enough for the obvious presence of a dwelling-house to be a deterrent to potential trespassers; and we simply do not know enough about the property to assess whether these suppositions are well-founded. Trespassers may largely have been following the path which had been cut across the land by floodwater and which lay fairly close to the road-cum-watercourse between the defendant's and the plaintiff's properties (55.16). The speaker does not however say that trespass occurred only along the new watercourse, and it appears that his father built a wall around the entire property (e.g. 55.3), which suggests that under the earlier, neglectful, owner neighbours began to trespass at several points. In that case, before the wall was built, it would have been necessary to survey all or most of the property to prevent trespass, and that may well have been difficult.

It is true, as Osborne points out, that the defendant never refers to a dwelling-house on his land (just as he does not speak of one on the plaintiff's land). Instead, to demonstrate that the land across which water had cut a new channel was not a (recognized) watercourse, the defendant refers to tombs put there before his family acquired the land and to vines and figs planted there before his father walled off the land. It must be realized, however, that by the references to tombs, vines, and figs he is not trying to make a point about his whole property but is simply seeking to show that there is no recognized watercourse across that area of land over which drainage water was cutting a new channel until his father kept it out. The plaintiff's claim that the defendant had walled off a watercourse is presented at 55.12, and the succeeding section of the speech from 55.12 to 55.15 is devoted to an attempt to prove the claim unfounded; and it is precisely in this section that the defendant refers to the tombs, vines, and figs. The speaker's arguments in this section of his speech are, firstly, that the land in question is not public land (and therefore, presumably, not a public watercourse) and that the plaintiff recognizes that it is private property⁶, and, secondly, that it is not a recognized watercourse on private land because there have been tombs, vines, and figs on it since before the alleged watercourse was walled off. The defendant speaks only of what stood on that part of his land which could be alleged to be a recognized watercourse or drain, and says

6. A cousin of the plaintiff had previously disputed the defendant's ownership of the land (55.1-2, 31), but that dispute does not seem to be an issue in the present case.

nothing about anything that may have stood on the rest of the farm. (We have no reason to suppose that the defendant's property consisted only of the area over which water formed a new watercourse; had that been so, since the new watercourse lay alongside the public road-cum-watercourse [55.16], his property would have been merely a strip, which is possible but unlikely⁷. The extent of the area on which the vines, figs, and tombs stood is obscured by the manner in which the speaker presents his case, for he does not say explicitly in 55.12-15 that he is referring only to part of his property: he expresses his purpose in these sections by the words 'I shall show that this is *khōrion* but not *kharadra*' (55.12), meaning apparently that he intends to show that 'this' (presumably the area of the channel cut by floodwater) is private property but not a recognized watercourse. He uses the term *khōrion* similarly in 55.15, asking the jurors whether his witnesses do not testify expressly that 'it is *khōrion* full of trees and has some tombs . . .'. In most cases in this speech the speaker uses the term *khōrion* to refer to 'a property' (i.e. some particular piece of landed property, most often his own⁸, but in 55.12 and 55.15 he uses the same term to define the legal status (i.e. private property) of a particular area of land which can in fact only form part of 'a property'. Both usages occur within 55.12-15: in 55.12 'I shall show that it is private property' and in 55.15 'to testify that it is private property full of trees', but in 55.14 'before we acquired the property'. In the phrase at 55.13 'on the property there are trees planted', *khōrion* can be taken to refer to the part of the estate (i.e. the alleged watercourse) under discussion in 55.12-15: it is a natural enough succession of ideas, when discussing only part of an estate, to say 'it is private property, and on the property there are trees'. The speaker's silence in 55.12-15 about a dwelling-house should therefore not be taken to mean that no residence existed on his land; clearly no dwelling-house stood on the part of his property over which floodwater cut a channel, but it remains entirely possible that one stood elsewhere.

Osborne's arguments against the existence of a dwelling-house on either the defendant's land or the plaintiff's are thus not conclusive. They certainly do not oblige us to believe that such residences did not exist on the defendant's or the plaintiff's land. There is, moreover, positive evidence to show that they did. It concerns the mothers of the defendant and the plaintiff. Until the plaintiff's family began legal proceedings against the defendant, the two women were friends and used to visit each other. It was on one such visit that the defendant's mother learned of the damage done by floodwater on the plaintiff's farm, and the defendant first heard of the matter when his mother told him what she had seen herself of the damage and what she had heard from the plaintiff's mother (55.23-24). Since during her visit she actually saw some of the damage, it is clear that she went to visit the other woman on the piece of land damaged by floodwater, and not at some other house elsewhere⁹. The speaker represents his mother's visit on that occasion as a normal social visit, before his family had learnt of the damage; even if one suspected – a suspicion for which the text offers no particular grounds – that the defendant's family had somehow learnt of the damage and had sent his mother to find out what she could on the pretext of a

7. The only certain conclusion that can be drawn about the size and shape of the defendant's farm from the speech is that on one side of the road separating it from the plaintiff's the defendant's land stretched considerably farther than did the plaintiff's on the other side: v. Paley's note on 55.17 in J.E.Sandys and F.A.Paley, *Select private orations of Demosthenes* Part II (Cambridge 1886). The speaker's words at 55.16 (Loeb translation: 'What could induce any man to make a channel through his private lands for water which would otherwise have gone rushing down a public road? would be very odd if he in fact owned no more than a strip alongside the road.

8. The speaker occasionally uses the plural *khōria* to refer to his land, without any apparent difference in sense: e.g. the attempt by the plaintiff's cousin to claim the defendant's land is described in identical terms in 55.1 and 55.31 save that *khōria* is used at 55.1 and *khōrion* at 55.31 (cf. 55.34). Also the plural *khōria* is used to describe that part of the defendant's property damaged by floodwater at 55.11, where clearly only a single piece of land is meant. There is thus no reason to deduce from the speaker's occasional use of the plural that he owned several pieces of land.

9. Otherwise we should have to suppose either that the defendant's mother called on the plaintiff's mother at a house away from the properties concerned in this speech and the two women then went to the plaintiff's farm, or that the damaged grain had been moved from the plaintiff's farm to some other house where the defendant's mother called and saw it. Nothing in the text indicates that either of these things happened, and they are not what a straightforward reading of the text suggests.

social call, her visit would still have had the form of a normal social visit. In that case she surely went to the other woman's home, and, since she went to the plaintiff's land on which the damage had occurred, the other woman's home was on that land. There was therefore a residence on one of the two pieces of land. Another phrase used by the speaker, however, shows that there were residences on both properties: the two mothers, he says, were friends and visited each other 'as was natural, since both lived in the country and were neighbours' (55.,23). The term 'neighbours' (discussed above) does not always imply residence in adjacent properties, but must carry that meaning in the phrase quoted: it would make no sense to say that the friendship between the two women was natural if they lived at a distance from each other at unrelated places in the country and were neighbours only in the sense that their families owned adjacent pieces of land. The speech therefore offers clear, if indirect, evidence that both the defendant's family and the plaintiff's lived in farmsteads on the adjacent pieces of land concerned in the lawsuit.

It is significant that the speaker never refers directly or explicitly to a residence existing on either farm, so that the presence of such residences must be deduced indirectly (and indeed Osborne was able to argue that no such residences existed). Clearly the speaker felt that the presence of such dwelling-houses could be taken for granted, and so they may be regarded as a not uncommon phenomenon, familiar enough to the Athenian jurymen trying the case. (It is notable that the one point at which the speaker takes the trouble to specify where someone lived is when he says that at the time when the land was walled off the plaintiff was living in the city of Athens [55.3])¹⁰. This speech is thus firm evidence for two isolated farmsteads in Attica of the fourth century B.C., and it strongly suggests that there were many more. Copyright © 1988 J.Roy

Pamela M.Huby (Liverpool): *Boetius vindicates Cicero as a logician* LCM 13.4 (Apr.1988), 60-61

This note is connected with a paper on Cicero's Topics given at Saarbrücken in 1987 and to be published in Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities 4, ed. P.Steinmetz and William Fortenbaugh. The form Boetius is recommended by Professor A.C.Lloyd, emeritus of this University.

The Kneales (*The Development of Logic* [Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1962], 179-81) have drawn attention to a section of Cicero's *Topics* which includes apparently Stoic material, namely the arguments 'special to dialecticians' involving antecedents and consequents and contradictions (53). This resembles closely the propositional logic of Chrysippus. It has seven elements as opposed to his five, and they have connected it with the similar lists given by Martianus Capella (IV 414-21) and the anonymous sixth century scholiast printed by Wallies at CAG vol.4.6, p.xi. Each account is faulty, but new evidence suggests that Cicero's was less faulty than at first appears. As it stands, his third rule is very similar to his sixth, but in Boetius' *Commentary on Cicero's Topics* (PL vol.64, col.1141C – Orelli prints the commentary in his edition of Cicero's works, but does not give the lemmata) the lemma from *Topics* 54 includes the following in connexion with the third rule: '*cum autem aliqua coniuncta negaris, et his alia negatio rursus adiungitur, et ex his primum sumpseris . . .*', where Cicero only has '*cum autem aliqua coniuncta negaris, et ex eis unum aut plura sumpseris . . .*'. This new version brings Cicero into harmony with Martianus Capella, and the third rule becomes: 'When you have denied some conjuncts, and to these another negation is added again, and you have assumed the first of these, what is left must be rejected', which amounts to: 'not, the first and not the second, but the first, therefore not not the second', which is what the Kneales supposed the third to be.

There remain two difficulties: (a) *tollendum* in both our and Boetius' versions must refer to negating the negative 'not the second', and so getting the second. Boetius, when he goes over the

10. The other passage in the speech which might be taken to show a place of residence is the description of the previous, neglectful, owner of the defendant's farm as 'a man who utterly disliked the district and was more of a townsman (*astikos*)' (55.11), which may mean that he lived in the town.

The speaker's statement that the plaintiff and his family 'are absolutely driving me out of the deme' (55.35) is best understood as referring to the deme in a purely topographical sense and not to the speaker's status as a deme-member: v. D.Whitehead, *The demes of Attika 508/7 - ca 250 B.C.* (Princeton 1986), p.77 with n.42. The speaker's phrase, taken on its own, need not mean that he lived in the deme but merely that he owned land in it; but the words are much more telling if (as has been argued in this paper) he lived on his land in the deme.

matter at 1142D, makes it clear that this is how he takes the passage. Using the example 'It is not a man and not an animal' he says: 'What is left, "It is not an animal" is removed (*aufertur*), and the conclusion is "It is an animal". (b) The words *eis unum aut plura* in our manuscripts, for the *his primum* of Boetius' text, suggest that, after the missing clause had gone, someone, seeing that Cicero's third was now the same as his sixth, tried to mend matters by allowing for more than two alternatives to be available, and so, rather ineptly, getting a different rule.

The point is valuable not only for its defence of Cicero's reputation as a logician, but also as showing that Boetius had available a manuscript that was better than those on which modern texts of Cicero's *Topics* are based.

Copyright © 1988 Pamela M.Huby

F.M.A.Jones (Chatham): *The lacuna at Petronius 26.6*

LCM 13.4 (Apr.1988), 61

26.6 *abiectioni in lectis sine metu reliquam exegimus noctem*

L

26.7 *venerat iam tertius dies, . . . (27.1) . . . cum subito |*
videmus senem calvum, . . . |

H

HL

MS evidence and a letter of Poggio suggest that *venerat iam tertius dies* began Book XIV (see Müller³, 407-413; van Thiel, *Petron: Überlieferung und Rekonstruktion* [Leiden 1971], 212-24). The reference to a new day, with *iam* and the pluperfect tense conform to that idea. A new day begins V.Aen.11; Ov.M.8; Luc.7; Val.Flacc.5; Sil.It.6; Stat.Ach.2 (cf. Theb.3 & 12); Ap.Met.2, 3,5,7 & 11. Such a beginning is frequent in Homer (the book-division, of course, predates Petronius).

Frequently sleep and/or night precede (see books ending with night at Ap.Rhod.2; Val.Flacc.2; Sil.It.5; Stat.Theb.5 & 11; Luc.6: with sleep, Luc.1; Ap.Met.1, 2,4 & 10; cf. Ach.Tat.5). Add the escapes at the end of Ap. Met.7, 8 & 10, and the appropriateness to Petronius 26.6 is striking.

L marks a lacuna between 26.6 and 27.1 *videmus senem calvum*. I suggest that *venerat iam tertius dies . . . cum subito* fills that lacuna.

Copyright © 1988 F.M.A.Jones

James Diggle (Queens' College, Cambridge): *Housman, Scaliger, and Wordsworth*

LCM 13.4 (Apr.1988), 61

'Great as was Scaliger's achievement it is yet surpassed and far surpassed by Bentley's: Scaliger at the side of Bentley is no more than a marvellous boy.' HOUSMAN, *Manilius* i.xvii

'I thought of Chatterton, the marvellous boy.' WORDSWORTH, *Resolution and Independence* 43

On literary allusions in Housman's prose writings see P.G.Naiditch, *Housman Society Journal* 12 (1986), 131-42. This allusion, so far as I am aware, has not been noticed.

Copyright © 1988 James Diggle

Brian Arkins (Galway) and **Desmond Egan** (Newbridge): *A further translation of Catullus 85*

LCM 13.4 (Apr.1988), 61-62

odi et amo. quare id faciam, fortasse requiris?

nescio, sed fieri sentio et excrucior.

I both loathe and am in love with her. How could I, might you ask?

Don't know – but this is how I feel and I'm crucified.

My attempt at a new translation of Catullus 85 (LCM 12.8 [Oct.1987], 12) has prompted the distinguished Irish poet Desmond Egan to compose the translation given above. This is here published for the first time, with his permission.

Mr Egan's *Collected Poems* (The National Poetry Foundation, University of Maine, 1983; The Goldsmith Press, Newbridge, Ireland, 1984), a collection (of seven previously published volumes) which won The National Poetry Foundation of America Award in 1983 and is reviewed by P.R.Connolly, *Studies* 75 (1986), 102-105, contains a considerable amount of Greek and Roman material; for example, the poem 'Thucydides and Lough Owel', and the volume *Siege* (1976),

which treats a celebrated kidnapping in terms of the Platonic concept of the Cave. Furthermore, he is currently engaged on a new translation, for the stage, of Euripides' *Medea*.

A brief comment on the translation. Line 2 is very effective and sharp, with the laconic 'don't know' and the maintenance of the metaphor in *excrucior*. As also the second part of line 1, with a nice emphasis on *fortasse requiris*. Which leaves the notoriously problematical *odi et amo*. Mr Egan's translation, of the length of which he is very conscious, captures the simultaneous nature of the contradictory emotions ('both . . . and'); accepts my view that *odi* means, in this context 'loathe'; and attempts to deal with *amo*, which he sees as hovering between the traditional 'love her' and my 'lust for her', by the intermediate locution 'am in love with her'.
Copyright © 1988 Brian Arkins & Desmond Egan.

The Editor wonders if he ought not to offer a prize (a year's subscription to LCM?) for a traduction raisonnée of this 'notorious' poem, to be received in time for judging (but by whom?) and publication in the Christmas Number.

Jeremy Paterson (Newcastle upon Tyne): *Roman tankers*

LCM 13.4 (Apr.1988), 62

Digest 47.2.21 deals with a number of ingenious puzzles which arise, at least in part, from the definition of *furtum* as *contrectatio*, 'handling'. When a man takes a *modius* of corn from a whole heap, is this *furtum* of the whole heap or only of the portion taken? This is elaborated with a variety of examples, such as theft of a small quantity of wine from a *dolium*, of a small quantity of corn from a ship, of water from a cistern.

Then: *quid deinde si nave vinaria (ut sunt multae in quas vinum effunditur), quid dicemus de eo qui vinum hausit?* Ignoring the probable need for a minor emendation of the text, why does the jurist need to define *navis vinaria*? As early commentators recognized, he must have in mind a special sort of ship. *vinum effunditur* cannot be taken as merely a loose way of saying 'filling a ship with amphorae full of wine'. At most periods carrying wine in amphorae was the norm for sea-borne commerce in the Mediterranean, so the definition would be pleonastic. It would not parallel the immediately preceding examples, water and wine in cisterns, and would provide no contrast with the succeeding example, precisely that of the taking of amphorae from a store.

We need a type of ship into which wine can be poured. In recent years underwater archaeology has revealed a number of examples of ships in which the main cargo area is taken up with large *dolia*, holding two to three thousand litres of wine each. Although examples of this form of 'tanker' have been found from widely different periods, the principal published examples from the Roman period belong to the first half of the first century A.D., and five of them seem to be connected with the wine-port of Minturnae (the best recent study is M.Corsi-Sciallano and B.Liou, *Les épaves de Tarraconaise à chargement d'amphores Dressel 2-4* [Archaeonautica 5, Paris 1985]).

The *Digest* passage is the unique reference in literature to this type of ship. *dolia* had a significant advantage over amphorae in their ration of weight to capacity; yet it is difficult to believe that the ships that carried them were not inherently unstable. It is tempting to dismiss the known examples as something of an experiment which did not catch on widely. However, the *Digest's multae* may suggest that we are dealing with a more significant phenomenon (for a discussion of the possible importance of *dolia*-ships see A.Tchernia, *Le Vin de l'Italie Romaine*, Rome 1986).
Copyright © 1988 Jeremy Paterson

P.Murgatroyd (Natal: Pietermaritzberg): *Some aspects of the structure of Pindar, Pythian 1*

LCM 13.4 (Apr.1988), 62-63

Much has already been written about the structure of *Pythian 1*, particularly in connexion with the linking words and themes that recur throughout, see especially R.W.B.Burton, *Pindar's Pythian Odes* (Oxford 1962), 91ff., H.M.Lee, *Aspects of Pindar's Art* (diss. Stanford 1972), 94ff., T.N.Gantz, *Ramus* 3 (1974), 143ff., S.D.Skulsky, *CP* 70 (1975), 8ff., and M.R.Lefkowitz, *The Victory Ode* (New Jersey 1976), 105ff., and scattered remarks have also been made about some of the instances of ring-composition, (see especially Burton 92, 98, 101 & 110, Lee 92, 118f., Lefkowitz 108, 123ff., also C.Greengard, *The Structure of Pindar's Epinician Odes* (Amsterdam 1980), 40f., and G.Kirkwood, *Selections from Pindar*

[Chico 1982], 131). But the extensiveness of the ring-structure, the absolute consistency with which it is employed to mark off sections clearly, and the dexterity of the transitions from section to section are noteworthy aspects of Pindar's art which have hitherto gone largely unnoted by critics.

In the opening picture of the golden lyre and its powers (1-12) Apollo (without an epithet) and the Muses (preceded each time by a polysyllabic compound adjective referring to their appearance) are mentioned at the start and the end.

The passage on Typhos (13-28) begins with a startling switch of mood and scene, but Zeus and the singing Muses in 13f. pick up 2, 5ff. and 12, the sea in 14 takes up the previous sections liquid imagery, and *θεῶν* (15) and *ἐκατοικάρανος* (16) recall *δαιμόνων* (12) and *κρατὶ* (8). There are two rings here: the lines on the volcanic eruptions by day and night (22-4) form the core; they are framed by two sentences in which streams of fire are emitted and a superlative occurs (21f. & 25f.); then in the outer (legendary) frame Typhos figures (suffering pain), Mount Etna is named (20 & 27), and *ἀκοῦσαι* (26) and *ποτικεκλιμένον* (28) are reminiscent of *ἀΐοντα* (14) and *κείται* (15).

As Pindar commences the next section (29-40, on the Pythian win and its importance for the town of Etna), he breaks off the mythical narrative, but in so doing progresses from Mount Etna and Typhos' punishment (imposed by Zeus) to Zeus, who frequents Etna (29f.). Here again there are two rings: 33-35 (on sailors) are surrounded firstly by verses alluding to the city Etna, its fame and victory in the chariot race (31ff. & 35ff.), and secondly by appeals for favour in which a deity's favourite mountain receives mention (and *εὐκάρποιο γαλας* in 30 is called to mind by *εὐανδρόν τε χάραν* in 40).

41-45 are a bridge passage, in which the poet explains the reason for the preceding prayer (note also *ἄνδρα* in 42 after *εὐανδρόν* in 40) and leads into the subsequent praise of Hieron's military exploits by announcing his intention to laud him, referring to might in 42 and using a weapon in the metaphor at 44f.. Here there is an echo of *ἐκ* (41) in *ἔξω* (44), of *χερσὶ* (42) in *παλάμα* (44) and of *χερσὶ βιαταί* (42) in the long throw of 45.

There is also an additional connexion between 41ff. and 46-57 (good wishes for, and celebration of Hieron) in *θεῶν παλάμαις* (48; cf. *θεῶν* in 41 and *παλάμα* in 44). This section's martial centre is enclosed by wishes for the tyrant's continued prosperity at 46 and 56f., which contain verbal parallels (*χρόνος*, *οὕτω*, *δόσιν* and *διδούς*, *εὐθύνοι* and the notion of straightness in *ὀρθωτήρ*).

58-66 (on Deinomenes and his town's Dorian traditions) start with another lively switch as Pindar now turns to the young prince, but 58f. (like 56f.) represent another appeal to heaven (with *θεός* in 56 taken up by *Μοῖσα* in 58 and *θεοδμάτῳ* in 61), and the author moves from the father to the son and then almost immediately re-introduces the father. At 58-60 and in the final sentence (65f.) there is talk of glorious victories and horses, and three names appear (with Pindus recalling Etna's neighbouring mountain and, because of its association with the Muses, as at Horace C.1.12.6, *Μοῖσα*).

In 67f. *τοιαύταν . . . αἶσαν* and *λόγον ἀνθρώπων* directly pick up the prosperity, glory and fame in 65f., and *αἰεὶ* (64) is repeated at 67, as Pindar proceeds to good wishes for the Etnaeans and further encomium of Hieron (67-80). The Deinomenid dynasty features at the beginning and end, and there are also links in *τέλει* (67) and *τελέσαις* (79), *Ἀμένα παρ' ὕδωρ* (67) and *παρὰ δὲ τὰν εὐνδρον ἀκτάν Ἥμερα* (79), *ἄνηρ* (69) and *ἀνδρῶν* (80), and *ύψω* (70) and *παλδεσσιν*, 79.

There is another bridge at 81-86 (*καλά*), where the poet suddenly (but with logical explanation) stops extolling his patron (echoing *δοσῆς* and *ἀνθρώπων* (68) and *βαρείας* (75) in *δοσῶν* at 82 and *βαρύνει* at 84) and glides to the precepts that commence in the second half of 86. This short passage has second person singular verbs in 81 and 86 and comparatives in 82 and 85.

The ode's conclusion (86-100) initially adds injunctions to the one in the first half of 86 and lists ways of attaining the enviable state alluded to in 85. It also rounds off the epinikion by returning to many of the opening section's words and motifs (*φόρμιγξ* 1: *φόρμιγγες* 97; *σύνδικον* 2: *δικαίῳ* 86; *ἀκούει* 2: *ἀκοάν* 90 & *ἀκούειν* 99; *δοῖδολ* 3: *δοῖδοῖς* 94; *αλενίου* 6: *αἰεὶ* 90; *ἀμφοτέρωθεν* 6: *ἀμφοτέροισι* 99; *ἀδύ* 8: *ἀδείαν* 90; *κατασχόμενος* 10: *κατέχει* 96; *φρένας* 12: *φιλόφρων* 94; the gold in one and the bronze in 95; the violets in 1 and the garland in 100; the fire in 5f. and the *καυτήρα* in 95; the eagle in 6 and the bull in 95; the king of birds in 7 and the rulers Croesus and Phalaris in 94ff.)

D.N.Levin(Rice University, Houston): *Two notes on Heliodorus*

LCM 13.4 (Apr.1988), 64

For the most part I laud the French translation of Heliodorus' *Aethiopica* provided by Pierre Grimal at pp.521-789 of his *Romans grec et latins* (= *Bibliothèque de la Pléiade* #134) (Paris 1958). I am less happy, however, with Grimal's insistence on translating the Heliodoran *οἱ βουκόλοι* regularly as '*les pasteurs*'. While it is true that this expression, like the etymologically related '*les pâtres*' (both go back to Latin *pastores*) employed by Jean Maillon in the translation accompanying R.M.Rattenbury's and T.W.Lumb's Budé text of the *Aethiopica* (3 vols., Paris 1935-1943; 2 ed. 1960), can be applied to herdsmen generally, the reader is likely to picture in his own mind shepherds (*οἱ ποιμένες*, albeit this term, like *pastores*, but in contrast to more specifically sheep- or goat-oriented *upiliones* or *opiliones*, is indeed applied sometimes to those who handle oxen) rather than neatherds.

However, if Maillon's '*les pâtres*' for *οἱ βουκόλοι* conveys a wrong image by suggesting that the herdsmen deal with flocks of sheep rather than with herds of cattle, then Grimal's '*les pasteurs*' conveys a doubly wrong image. For the latter of the two French terms, in contradistinction to its more earthy doublet, conjures up in the mind of the reader both real shepherds solicitous for their flocks and Protestant divines solicitous for flocks consisting not not sheep, but of human beings in need of comparable guidance. Those *βουκόλοι*, however, who roam through the marshes of the Nile Delta are not kindly souls, but brigands and outlaws. And their motto, as expressed by Thyamis himself (himself, ironically, priest-turned-bandit-leader), appears to be 'Kill or be killed'.

What, then, should I have preferred for Maillon and Grimal to do? It seems to me that, had both translators chosen to refer to the malefactors in question as '*les bouviers*' rather, they not only would have rendered *οἱ βουκόλοι* more accurately into French; they also would have conveyed an image close to that conveyed by our own 'cowboys', employed in certain contexts regularly with pejorative rather than with favorable import.

II

Just as Chariton in his *Chaereas and Callirhoe* becomes preoccupied again and again with the dichotomy of Greek and Barbarian, so does Heliodorus in his *Aethiopica*. The latter novelist, however – perhaps his being himself a Phoenician from Emesa is a factor –, at least allows for gradations. Thus Thermouthis, who cannot even communicate directly with Theagenes and Charicleia, but needs Cnemon (apparently the young Athenian-in-exile has sojourned in Egypt long enough to learn the language) to take on the job of interpreter, must count as *echt barbarisch*. By contrast, his very civilized countryman Calasiris, whom Cnemon mistook at first for a fellow Greek, so well did he express himself in the latter's native tongue (it helps, of course, that the old charlatan-priest travelled extensively in the Greek world before returning to his homeland), establishes himself on a basis of full equality with the Greeks with whom he comes into contact.

What of the heroine Charicleia herself? In Egypt she falls captive to a troop under the command of the eunuch Bagoas. Recognizing Ethiopians as such by the colour of their skin (*καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς χροῖας Αἰθιοπίας εἶναι τοὺς φανέντας γνωπλῶντες*) (8.16.3), the captors separate blonde, blue-eyed, and pale-skinned Charicleia (elsewhere the novelists offers an ingenious, but hardly very plausible explanation of how a Negro monarch and his Negro bride could produce such offspring) from her countrymen. And that same heroine, though ready now for a destiny which will bring her back to her native land, continues nonetheless to think of herself as Greek, as does also her Greek-born consort-to-be Theagenes, which latter in response to questioning applies not to himself alone, but likewise to Charicleia the expression *Ἕλληνες γένος* (8.17.3) – or, to be more precise, the Egyptian equivalent thereof. In truth, only *he* is 'Greek as to race', whereas *she*, the Ethiopian-born erstwhile foster-child of the Delphic priest Charicles, is 'Greek only environmentally', so to speak, much as the heroine and title-figure of Helen Hunt Jackson's nineteenth-century novel *Ramona*, whose biological antecedents could be traced to the British Isles, was culturally and environmentally Hispano-Mexican.